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Abstract 
A simple three-stage model of the Scandinavian moose (Alces alces) (young, adult female and 
adult male) is formulated. Fecundity is density dependent while mortality is density 
independent. Two different harvesting regimes are explored: hunting for meat, and trophy 
hunting. The paper gives an economic explanation of the biological notion of females as 
‘valuable’ and males as ‘non-valuable’. The paper also demonstrates how this notion may 
change under shifting economic and ecological conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to demonstrate the economic content of a structured 
wildlife population model; and second, to show how this economic content may change under 
different management scenarios. Analysing structured wildlife harvesting models, i.e., models 
where the species are grouped in different classes according to age and sex, has a long 
tradition within biology. Caswell (2001) gives a recent in-depth overview; see also Getz and 
Haigh (1989). However, economic analysis plays only a minor role in these works. Economic 
analysis is introduced more explicitly in Cooper (1993), who formulates a simulation model 
that finds the economically optimal level of deer tags for hunting zones and where the deer 
population is structured in bucks and does. Skonhoft et al. (2002) analyses various 
management strategies for a mountain ungulate living in a protected area and a hunting area. 
Four stages are included: females and males within and outside the protected area. Because of 
the complexity of these models, however, it is difficult to understand the various economic 
mechanisms influencing harvesting and abundance. 
 
The present paper analyses such economic mechanisms more explicitly. A simple three-stage 
model (young, adult females and adult males) is formulated. Our analysis is similar to that of 
Clark and Tait (1982), who studied the optimal harvest value in a sex-selective harvesting 
model where the population was grouped into two stages. See also the two-stage seal model in 
Conrad and Bjørndal (1991). As in Clark and Tait, we analyse biological equilibrium where 
natural growth is balanced by harvesting. However, in contrast to Clark and Tait, trophy 
hunting, in addition to meat-value maximization, is analysed. We also calculate the shadow 
values of the adult males and females. We are thus giving an economic explanation of the 
biological notion of females as ‘valuable’ and males as ‘non-valuable’. 
 
The model is applied for a moose population (Alces alces), and is studied within a 
Scandinavian ecological and institutional context. Moose is by far the most important game 
species in Scandinavia, and in Norway and Sweden about 40,000 and 100,000 animals, 
respectively, are shot every year. Moose hunting has traditionally been a local activity, and 
landowners receive the hunting value. The hunters have been the local people; the landowners 
and their families and friends, and the management goal has been to maximize the meat value 
to retain stable populations (more details are provided in Skonhoft and Olaussen 2005). 
During the last few years, however, a more commercialized hunting and wildlife industry has 
emerged, and Scandinavian moose hunting is gradually shifting from a ‘family and friend’ 
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activity to a game-hunting market. The trophy value of old males plays an important role here. 
Both the traditional exploitation scheme and the new commercialized scheme are studied, and 
the consequences for harvesting and the population composition are analysed. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the three-stage moose population 
model is formulated. Section three demonstrates what happens when the hunting is steered by 
the traditional landowner goal of maximizing meat value. In section four we study the sex and 
age composition under the new exploitation regime of trophy hunting. Section five illustrates 
the models by some numerical simulations, while section six summarizes our findings. 
 
2. Population model 
The Alces alces is a large ungulate with mean slaughter body weight (about 55% of live 
weight) for adult moose in Scandinavia of about 170 kg for males and 150 kg for females. 
The non-harvest mortality rates are generally low due to lack of predators, and there is no 
evidence of density-dependent mortality. On the other hand, fecundity has proven to be 
affected by the female density while the number of males, within the range of moose densities 
in Scandinavia, seems to be of negligible importance (see, e.g., Nilsen et al. 2005 for more 
details). 
 
The population at time (year) t  is structured in three stages (Lande et al. 2003); calves 0tX , 
adult females (  year) 1≥ f tX  and adult males (  year) 1≥ mtX  so that the total population is 
0 f m
t t t tX X X X= + + . These three stages are henceforth called young, female and male. The 
population is measured in spring after calving. All stages are generally harvested, and the 
hunting takes place in September–October. All natural mortality is assumed to take place 
during the winter, after the hunting season, as the natural mortality throughout summer and 
fall is small and negligible. The same natural mortality rate is imposed for males and females. 
As indicated, natural mortality is fixed and density independent, while reproduction is density 
dependent. The same sex ratio is assumed for the young when they enter the old stages (again, 
see Nilsen et al. 2005). 
 
Neglecting any stochastic variations in biology and environment, and any dispersal in and out 
of the considered area, the number of young at time ( 1)t +  is first governed by: 
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(1) 0 1 ft ttX r X+ =  
 
with  as the fertility rate (number of young per female). The fertility rate is dependent 
on female density (number of females): 
0tr >
 
(2) ( )f ttr r X=  
 
with  (when omitting the time subscript) and where  is fixed. 
Combining (1) and (2) gives the recruitment function 
/ 'fdr dX r= < 0 (0) 0r >
0 ( )f fX r X X=  with 
. The recruitment function is assumed to be concave. For obvious 
reasons  should hold in an optimal harvesting programme. 
0 / ( 'f fdX dX r X r= + )
00 / fdX dX ≥
 
The abundance of (old) females follows next as: 
 
(3) 0 0 01 0.5(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )f f ft t t t tX m h X m h X+ = − − + − −  
 
where  and  are the density-independent mortality fractions of young and female 
(and male), respectively, while  and 
0 0m > 0m >
0
th f th  are the harvesting fractions. Half of the young 
population is female, after harvesting and natural mortality. The number of (adult) males is 
finally given by: 
 
(4) 0 0 01 0.5(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )m mt t t mt tX m h X m h X+ = − − + − −  
 
where  is the male harvesting fraction. mth
 
When combining equations (1)–(3), the female population dynamic reads 
0 0
1 10.5(1 )(1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )
f f f f f
t t t t t tX m h r X X m h X+ −= − − + − − . This is a second-order non-linear 
difference equation, and numerical analyses demonstrate that the equilibrium is stable for 
fixed harvesting fractions (see, e.g., Gandolfo 2001 for a theoretical exposition). Omitting the 
time subscript, the equilibrium reads: 
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(5) 0 00.5(1 )(1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )f f f f fX m h r X X m h= − − + − − X .  
 
There are two equilibria: the trivial one of 0fX =  and  given by 0fX >
0 0 1 0.5(1 )(1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )f fm h r X m h= − − + − − . Because ' 0r < , the non-trivial equilibrium will 
be unique and may be written as: 
 
(5’) 0( , )f fX F h h=  
 
where  represents a functional form. We find (..)F 0 0/ 0F h F∂ ∂ = <  and . Therefore, 
the iso-population female lines slope downwards in the 
0fF <
0( , )fh h  plane, and lines closer to the 
origin yield a higher stock. 
 
By combining equations (1), (2) and (4), the male population growth reads 
0 0
1 10.5(1 )(1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )
m f f
t t t t
m m
t tX m h r X X m h X+ −= − − + − − . The dynamic of the males is 
therefore contingent upon the female growth (but not vice versa as only female abundance 
regulates fertility), and again numerical analyses demonstrate that the equilibrium is stable. 
The equilibrium is: 
 
(6) . 0 00.5(1 )(1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )m f fX m h r X X m h= − − + − − m mX
f
 
There are two equilibria for the male population as well: the trivial one, when , and 
 when . Equation (6) may also be written as: 
0fX =
0mX > 0fX >
 
(6’)  0( , ) ( )m m fX G h h r X X=
 
where . Again, it is confirmed that higher 
harvesting rates mean fewer animals, 
0 0 0( , ) 0.5(1 )(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )]m mG h h m h m h= − − − − −
0 0G <  and 0mG < . The male iso-population lines 
hence slope downwards in the  plane, and lines closer to the origin yield a higher 
stock. On the other hand, a higher female sub-population shifts these iso-population lines 
away from the origin (suggesting that the slope of the recruitment function is positive, see 
0( , )mh h
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above), meaning that there is room for more male harvesting for a given young sub-
population harvest, and vice versa. 
 
Equation (6’) also indicates that the equilibrium male–female proportion decreases with more 
females. However, the male–female proportion may be more easily recognized when 
combining (5) and (6), which yields . We 
therefore simply have  if 
/ [1 (1 )(1 )] /[1 (1 )(1 )]m f f mX X m h m h= − − − − − −
/ 1m fX X = mh h f= , as the mortality of males and females is equal, 
and the same fraction of young enters the female and male sub-populations. 
 
3. Exploitation. The traditional regime: hunting for meat 
As indicated, the traditional exploitation of the Scandinavian moose has been directed by 
maximizing the meat value in ecological equilibrium. Because natural mortality takes place 
after the hunting season, the equilibrium number of animals removed is simply 0 0 fH h rX= , 
f f fH h X=  and m m mH h X= , so that the total harvest equals 0 f mH H H H= + + . The 
management goal of the landowner(s) is accordingly to optimize the value: 
 
(7)
0
0 0 0 0
, , , ,
max ( ) [ ( ) ]
f m f m
f f m m f f f f f m m m
X X h h h
U p w H w H w H p w h r X X w h X w h X= + + = + +  
 
subject to ecological constraints (5’) and (6’). 0 f mw w w< <  are the (average) body slaughter 
weights (kilograms per animal) of the three stages while p  is the meat price (NOK per 
kilogram). However, for obvious reasons, the meat price will not affect the optimization 
except for scaling the shadow price values (see below). 
 
The Lagrangian of this problem writes 
0 0 0 0[ ( ) )] [ ( , )] [ ( , ) ( ) ]f f f f f m m m f f m m f fL p w h r X X w h X w h X X F h h X G h h r X Xλ μ= + + − − − −
with 0λ ≥  and 0μ ≥  as the shadow prices of the female and male population, respectively.1 
The first-order conditions of this maximizing problem are (the second-order conditions are 
fulfilled due to the concavity of the recruitment function): 
 
                                                 
1 The interpretation of λ  and μ  as shadow prices is not obvious as the population sizes are determined within 
the model. However, when adding fX , interpreted as an exogenous number of introduced females, to the stock 
constraint (5’), it can be shown that * / fU X λ∂ ∂ = , and where  denotes the maximum value of U . In the 
same manner, adding 
*U
mX  as an exogenous number of introduced males to (6’) gives * / mU X μ∂ = . ∂
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(8) , 0 0/ [ ( ' ) ] ( ' )f f f f fL X p w h r X r w h G r X rλ μ∂ ∂ = + + − + + = 0
 
(9) , / 0m m mL X pw h μ∂ ∂ = − =
 
(10) ; 0 0 0 0/ 0
f fL h pw rX F G rXλ μ∂ ∂ = + + ≤ 00 1h≤ < , 
 
(11) ; 0 1/ 0f f f fL h pw X Fλ∂ ∂ = + ≤ fh≤ < , 
 
and 
 
(12) ; / 0m m m fmL h pw X G rXμ∂ ∂ = + ≥ 0 1mh< ≤ . 
 
Conditions (8) and (9) steer the shadow price values, and (9) suggests that the male shadow 
price should be equal to its marginal harvested value. Equation (8) is somewhat more 
complex, but indicates that the female shadow price should be equal to the sum of the 
marginal harvested value of the female and the young sub-populations, plus the indirect male 
marginal harvested value, evaluated at its shadow price. Rewriting equation (8) when using 
condition (9) yields 0 0( )( ' )m m f f fp w h w h G r X r pw hλ = + + + . As the slope of the 
recruitment function is non-negative, ( ' ) 0fr X r+ ≥  (see above), f fpw hλ ≥  holds. Hence, 
while the shadow value of the male population is exactly equal to its marginal harvested 
value, the shadow value of the female population is above its marginal harvested value. In this 
sense, females may be considered as more ‘valuable’ than males in line with the biological 
notion of females as valuable and males as non-valuable. 
 
Conditions (10)–(12) are the control conditions with the actual complementary slackness 
conditions stated. From the male control condition (12), harvesting the whole population 
could be considered as a possibility as this is the biological ‘end’ product. On the other hand, 
keeping the female and young sub-populations unexploited are also options as these stages 
represent the reproductive and potentially reproductive biological capital. Condition (10) 
indicates that the harvesting of young should take place up to the point where the harvesting 
benefit is equal to, or below, the cost in terms of reduced population of males and females 
evaluated at their respective shadow prices. When (10) holds as an inequality, the marginal 
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harvesting benefit is below its marginal cost and harvesting is thus not profitable, . The 
interpretation of the female harvesting condition (11) is somewhat simpler. Because of the 
fecundity density effect, meaning that one more female on the margin yields a smaller 
recruitment when the female population is ‘high’ than when ‘low’, 
0 0h =
0fh =  seems less likely. 
 
The male harvesting condition (12) is analogous to the female harvesting condition (11), but 
the cost–benefit ratio generally works in the opposite direction. This condition always holds 
as an inequality. This is revealed when first combining conditions (9), (12) and (6’), which 
yield . When next substituting for G  (and ) from equation (6), we find that 
. After some 
small rearrangements, it reduces to . Accordingly, because ,  and the whole 
male population should be harvested. Notice that this result holds irrespective of the meat 
value of males and females (as given by the body weights). 
( ) 0m mG h G+ ≥
/[1 (1 )(1 )]} 0mm h m h h m h− − − − − − − − − ≥
)]
mG
0 0{0.5(1 )(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )]}{1 (1 )m mm−
0m ≥ 0m > 1mh =
 
The reason for harvesting the whole biological ‘end’ product as the best option is the lack of 
any trade-offs when the meat value is maximized; there is neither any biological feed-back 
effects from the other stages nor any price demand response. Accordingly, the male–female 
proportion becomes  (section two above) in the optimal 
programme while one more male (cf. also footnote 1) yields a benefit of 
/ [1 (1 )(1m f fX X m h= − − −
mpwμ =  (NOK per 
animal). If the optimal policy at the same time gives 0 0h = , the female shadow price reads 
( ' )m f f fpw G r X r pw hλ = + + . As  when 00.5(1 )G = −m 1mh =  and 0 0h =  (equation 6’) and 
f mw w< , the female shadow price may be lower than the male shadow price in contrast to the 
above notion of females as more ‘valuable’ than males. In addition, from condition (8), it may 
also be shown that if 1 ( ' )f f fG r X r w h− + > , then μ λ> . This shows more directly that a 
low female slaughter weight may pull in the same direction. 
 
4. Exploitation. Present time: trophy hunting 
The moose-harvesting regime in Scandinavia (like wildlife hunting in other places, see, e.g., 
Anderson and Hill (1995)) is gradually changing, and a hunting and wildlife industry is 
emerging. ‘Present times’ are modelled by introducing a market for trophy hunting of males 
while still having meat-value hunting of the other two stages. The market for trophy hunting 
is probably something between a competitive market and a monopoly. One of these extremes 
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is chosen, and we assume that trophy-hunting licences are supplied under monopolistic 
conditions. Following the practice in Scandinavia, one licence allows the buyer to kill one 
animal, which is paid only if the animal is killed. In addition to price, the demand for trophy-
hunting licences may also be contingent upon ‘quality’, expressed by the abundance of males. 
The inverse market demand for male hunting licences is hence given as: 
 
(13) . ( ,m m mq q h X X= )
 
The licence price  (NOK per animal) decreases with a higher harvest, 
, while it increases with more animals available, . Supplying 
trophy-hunting licences is also costly and depends on the number of animals shot: 
q
/ ( ) 0m mHq q h X= ∂ ∂ < 0Xq >
 
(14)  ( )m mC C h X=
 
where fixed cost , and variable cost  and . The fixed component 
includes the cost of preparing and marketing the hunting, whereas the variable component 
includes the cost of organizing the permit sale, the costs of guiding and various transportation 
services. 
(0) 0C > ' 0C > '' 0C ≥
 
The landowner management goal is now to find a harvesting policy that maximizes the sum of 
the meat value and trophy-hunting profits: 
 
(15) , 
0
0 0
, , , ,
max [ ( ) ] [ ( , ) ( )]
f m f m
f f f f f m m m m m m m
X X h h h
p w h r X X w h X q h X X h X C h Xπ = + + −
 
again subject to the constraints (5’) and (6’). The first-order conditions of this problem are 
(where L  again refers to the Lagrange function): 
 
(16)  2/ ( ) 'm m m m m m mH XL X q h X qh C h q h X μ∂ ∂ = + − + − = 0
m m m m m f
H mL h q X h qX C X G rXμ∂ ∂ = + − + ≥ 0 1mh
 
and  
 
(17) ; 2/ ( ) ' 0 ≤ , <
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 in addition to conditions (8), (10) and (11). 
 
The male harvesting benefit is now expressed by a marginal profit term plus a marginal stock 
effect through the demand quality effect. The interpretation of (16) and (17) is straightforward 
(see also above). Combining these conditions and (6’) yields 
, where the term  is still strictly 
positive because  (section three above). When first disregarding the quality effect, 
, not harvesting all males, 
( ')( )m m m m mH m Xq X h q C G h G q h X G+ − + + ≥ 0m ( )m mG h G+
0m >
0Xq = 1mh < , will hence represent the optimal solution if the 
marginal harvesting profit is equal to zero, ( ') 0m mHq X h q C+ − = . From condition (16) (as 
well as from equation 17), it is seen that this implies a zero value male shadow price. While 
not harvesting down the whole stage, a zero value shadow price is a counterintuitive result, 
but hinges on the biological ‘end’ product nature of the adult males; the number of males does 
not affect fertility. The zero marginal harvesting profit condition may be met if the marginal 
cost is high and/or the inverse demand schedule is steep (inelastic). On the other hand, if the 
marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost for 1mh = , the same solution type as above is 
obtained and where μ  is positive. 
 
When taking the demand quality effect into account, , 0Xq > 1mh <  may still hold as an 
optimal solution when the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost 
, as  and (( ') 0m mHq X h q C+ − > ' 0mG < 0' )m mG h G+ >  (see above). The economic reason 
for this result is simple, as constraining the harvest and keeping a high stock size works in the 
direction of a higher trophy-hunting licence price through the quality shift in demand. From 
equation (16) it is seen that this situation implies that 0μ > . The corner solution of  is 
also now a possibility, but the marginal harvesting profit must then exceed a certain 
minimum, equal to the shadow price. 
1mh =
 
While the first-order conditions for harvesting female and young are the same as in the 
traditional harvesting regime, the new conditions for male harvesting will obviously spill over 
to these stages. With , we may typically find that the male–female proportion 1mh < /m fX X  
increases compared with the traditional regime, which may be reinforced if fh  shifts up at the 
same time. Moreover, while the meat price p  had no effect on the optimal harvesting policy 
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in the traditional regime, it may now influence the optimal harvesting policy of all three 
stages. This will generally occur when the quality effect is included and we have 0μ > . In 
line with standard harvesting theory, a larger harvest and fewer male and young animals is 
accompanied by a higher price. On the other hand, with no quality effect and with a zero 
shadow price value of the males, p  will have no effect as the conditions (5), (8) , (10) and 
(11) then alone determine , 0h fh , fX and λ . 
 
5. Numerical illustration 
Data and specific functional forms 
The two exploitation schemes will now be illustrated numerically. The fecundity rate, 
decreasing in the number of females, is specified as a sigmoidal function with an increasing 
degree of density dependence at high densities (Nilsen et al. 2005): 
 
(2’) ( )
1 ( / )
f
f b
rr r X
X K
= = +

  
 
with  as the intrinsic growth rate (maximum number of young per female) and  as 
the female stock level for which density-dependent fertility is equal to density-independent 
fertility. Thus, for a stock level above K, density-dependent factors dominate. The 
compensation parameter  indicates to what extent density-independent effects 
compensate for changes in the stock size. (2’) implies a recruitment function 
0r > 0K >
0b >
0 ( ) /[1 ( / ) ]f f f fX r X X rX X K= = + b , which is of the so-called Sheperd type. 
 
The trophy demand function is specified linear. In addition, it is assumed that the quality 
effect as given by the number of males, through the parameter 0γ ≥ , shifts the demand 
uniformly up: 
 
(13’) . 
mX mq e h Xγα β= − m
 
Accordingly, the choke price 0α >  gives the maximum willingness to pay with a zero quality 
effect, 0γ = , whereas 0β >  reflects the market price response in a standard manner. The 
trophy cost function is given linearly as well: 
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(14’) m mC c ch X= +  
 
so that 0c ≥  is the fixed cost and  is the constant marginal cost. Table 1 gives the 
baseline parameter values. For these demand and cost functions we find that the optimal 
number of hunted males will be 
0c >
( ) / 2m mh X cα β= −  without the demand quality effect and 
when 0μ =  holds at the same time (equation 16). 
 
 Table 1 about here 
 
Results 
Table 2 reports the results. As a benchmark, a no-hunting scenario is also included (first row). 
Since the young enters the (adult) male and female stages at the same sex ratio, the number of 
males and females are here the same. In the traditional regime with meat-value maximization, 
the female harvest rate becomes 0.26 while no harvest of young represents an optimal policy. 
The marginal harvesting benefit of young is hence below the marginal cost in term of losses 
from reduced harvesting of males and females. Notice that the number of young is lower in 
the no-hunting scenario than in the traditional regime. The reason is that the number of 
females is above the value representing the peak value of the recruitment function and 
 without harvesting. The male shadow value is about four times 
above that of the female shadow value. As demonstrated in section three, the male shadow 
value is exactly equal to its marginal harvesting value of 
0 / ( ' )f fdX dX r X r= + 0<
hpwμ = , while the female shadow 
value is above its marginal harvesting value. However, because of the low female harvesting 
fraction and an optimal harvesting policy close to the peak of the recruitment function (that is, 
is small and positive (see above)), the female shadow value becomes low. ( ' )fr X r+
 
 Table 2 about here 
 
The current exploitation scheme is first studied when the quality effect is disregarded; that is 
0γ =  and the inverse demand function (13’) reads . Harvesting down all the 
males is no longer the optimal policy, and the harvesting fraction is substantially reduced, 
. As expected, the male–female proportion increases, and at the same time the 
m mq hα β= − X
0.24mh =
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female harvesting fraction shifts up slightly compared with the traditional regime. It is still 
beneficial, however, to keep the young population unexploited. 
 
When the quality effect is included, the male harvesting rate, as expected, is further reduced 
and is accompanied by a positive shadow value indicating that the marginal harvesting 
income exceeds the marginal cost in optimum. The difference between the male and female 
shadow values is now quite small. The female harvesting rate decreases somewhat as well. As 
a consequence, the total stock size is higher when the quality effect is included and 
substantially higher than that of the traditional harvesting scheme of meat-value 
maximization. The table also demonstrates that the profit increases compared with the 
traditional regime, and that it further increases when the demand quality effect is added. 
However, for obvious reasons, the specification of the demand function and parameterization 
play a critical role here. 
 
Shifting up the meat price p  simply scales up the shadow price values in the traditional 
regime. In the trophy-hunting regime with no quality effect and with a zero shadow price 
value of the males, the harvesting activity and stock sizes will, as explained above, be 
unaffected as well. On the other hand, with the quality included and 0μ > , the male 
harvesting activity interacts with the other stages and hence p  has an allocation effect as 
well. However, sensitivity analyses show that the female harvest rate increases only modestly 
even for a quite dramatic price increase. The reason is that female stock is close to the peak of 
the recruitment function. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The paper has analysed a three-stage model of the Scandinavian moose with density-
dependent fertility. Two exploitation schemes have been studied and it is demonstrated that 
harvesting down the whole biological ‘end’ product, i.e., the (adult) male population in this 
model, always represents the best option when meat-value maximization is the goal. In the 
numerical examples, this option is accompanied by zero harvesting of the young and modest 
female harvesting. Within this regime, the biological notion of females as ‘valuable’ and 
males as ‘non-valuable’ is easily recognized, even if the shadow value of the males might be 
higher than that of the females. The current exploitation scheme with a market for trophy 
hunting changes the optimal harvesting condition of males. Hunting down the whole 
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population will no longer be the best option if a well developed market for trophy hunting is 
present. In addition, the trophy-hunting market allocation also spills over to the conditions for 
meat-value maximization of young and females. The male–female population ratio will 
increase, and more female harvesting may take place. 
 
Although the model is simple, it encompasses some general results that will survive in more 
complex stage-structured models. Most importantly, we have highlighted the economic forces 
influencing harvest in three different stages that, in various degrees, are present in many 
structured population models. Our model has two recruiting stages that recruit in different 
ways. The young represents a value through recruitment to the (adult) male and female stages. 
As long as density-dependent growth factors are weak, or non-existent (as here), harvesting 
young does not pay off. For the females, on the other hand, a traditional trade-off between 
recruitment and harvest is present through the density-dependent fertility mechanism. This 
mechanism will also be present in more complex models. Finally, the (adult) male stage is 
considered as the biological ‘end’ product, and thus does not influence recruitment. It is 
therefore tacitly assumed that there are always enough males for reproduction. However, 
irrespective of this, our model demonstrates that the male optimal harvest policy depends 
critically on economic conditions. 
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 Table 1: Biological and economic parameter values 
  
          
Parameters 
 
Description 
 
Baseline value 
 
Reference/source 
r  max. specific growth rate 1.15 Nielsen et al. (2005) 
K female stock level where density 
dependent factors dominates 
density independent factors 
    1,000 animal Nielsen et al. (2005) 
b density compensation parameter 2 Nielsen et al. (2005) 
w0 average weight young 60 kg SSB (2004) 
wf average weight females 150 kg SSB (2004) 
wm average weight male 170 kg SSB (2004) 
m0 natural mortality young 0.05 Nielsen et al. (2005) 
m natural mortality female and male 0.05 Nielsen et al. (2005) 
p meat price 50 NOK/kg Storaas et al.  (2001) 
α choke price 30,000 NOK/animal Calibrated 
γ quality parameter demand 0.0001 Calibrated 
β slope parameter demand 60 NOK/animal2 Calibrated 
c  fixed harvest cost 500,000 NOK Calibrated 
c marginal harvest cost 2,000 NOK/animal Calibrated 
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Table 2: Ecological and economic equilibrium, different management regimes. h0 harvest 
fraction young, hf  harvest fraction female, hm  harvest fraction male ,h total harvest fraction, X0 
number of young (in 1,000 animals),Xf number of females (in 1,000 animals), Xm number of  
males  (in 1,000 animals), X total stock ( in 1,000 animals), λ female shadow price (in 1,000 
NOK per animal), μ male shadow price (in 1,000 NOK per animal) and, π  profit (in 1,000 NOK) 
 
(-- indicates value not calculated) 
 
  
Hunting 
regimes 
 
h0 
 
hf 
 
hm 
 
h 
 
X0 
 
Xf 
 
Xm 
 
X 
 
λ 
 
μ 
 
π 
 
 
No harvest 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.33 
 
 
3.15 
 
 
3.15 
 
 
6.63 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
Traditional 
regime, 
hunting for 
meat 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.26 
 
 
1 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
0.57 
 
 
0.92 
 
 
0.27 
 
 
1.76 
 
 
2.2 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
4,099 
Modern 
times; 
trophy 
hunting. 
No quality 
effect 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.28 
 
 
0.24 
 
 
0.20 
 
 
0.57 
 
 
0.85 
 
 
0.97 
 
 
2.39 
 
 
2.1 
 
 
0 
 
 
4,599 
 
Modern 
times; 
trophy 
hunting. 
With quality 
effect 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.25 
 
 
0.09 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
0.57 
 
 
0.95 
 
 
2.01 
 
 
3.53 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
5,594 
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